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COMMENTS
CONFLICT OF LAWS-POSSIBILITY OF SUIT UNDER LOCAL WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE FOR DEATH OF DOMICILIARY IN FOREIGN STATE.
This comment has been prompted by the recent decision of the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Pearson v. Northeast
Airlines, Inc.1 In that case the court reviewed certain problems involving
the application of local public policy in those situations where a state or
a federal court must determine which substantive law should be applied
to a particular transaction or occirrence. The review assumed that two
or more states had contacts with the transaction which were significant
enough so that each could reasonably contend that its contacts justified
its controlling the choice of law. More importantly, the court was con-
cerned with the restrictions imposed by the federal constitution on the
choices which in each case must be made.
The purpose of this comment is to show some of the problems in-
volved in a forum's attempt to ignore on public policy grounds some of
the substantive provisions of the foreign statute or law to which the
forum has been referred by its choice of law rules; and how the problems
may be surmounted in a just and reasonable manner by a different ap-
proach to them. Specifically, the problems are these:
1.) Can the forum, while requiring plaintiffs in a wrongful death
action to sue under the wrongful death statute of the lex loci
delictus, ignore substantive provisions of the foreign statute on
public policy grounds?
2.) What law governs in deciding whether the provisions in ques-
tion are substantive or procedural?
3.) Is there a denial of full faith and credit when a court applies
part, but not all, of the substantive provisions of the foreign
statute ?
The suggested approach to these problems, and thus, in effect, the
avoidance of them, is simply this: where a domiciliary is killed while
traveling through another state, or even while temporarily present therein
for a time, the forum state may allow suit under its own wrongful death
1. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
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statute rather than requiring a plaintiff to always look to the death
statute of the locus delicti for the basis of his claim.
I.
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS.
Conflict of laws law is a relatively recent development in Anglo-
American legal systems. As territorial boundary lines have ceased to be real
boundaries in people's lives and relations due to the advent and develop-
ment of improved means of communication and transportation, citizens of
one state or country have far more dealings with citizens of other states
and countries, and consequently, litigation arises involving for the courts
foreign elements and laws which cannot be totally ignored. In the United
States, especially, the problems are far more important due to the con-
stitutional provisions of due process and full faith and credit.
Joseph Story, the most notable American writer in the field of
private international law, gave us our first authoritative treatise in
English on the subject, and from Story one can trace the history of
private international law in both England and America. 2 Story formed a
theory that foreign law actually operates in the forum, but at the will of
the forum. That is, the forum enforces foreign law out of courtesy or
comity.3 As it turned out, however, the comity theory tended to produce a
homeward trend, the courts feeling that since the application of foreign
law involved the extension of foreign law into the forum, and since foreign
law was given its extraterritoriality only by way of comity, then the
forum could refuse to apply foreign law simply because the policy of the
forum differed from the policy of the state where the cause of action
arose.
4
In an effort to limit the public policy principle, at least as among
the states of the United States, and consequently to allow for certainty
of result in most cases, the "vested rights" theory has been offered. Under
this theory, the idea that foreign law actually operates within the forum
was rejected and replaced with the idea that rights become vested where
the cause of action arises, and the forum merely gives legal effect to acts
2. CHEATHAM, GOODRICH, GRISWOLD & RPsSE, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 5(4th ed. 1957).
3. GOODRICH, CONFLICT or LAWS 10 (3r4 ed. 1940).
4. Beach, Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights, 27 YALE L.J. 656, 662(1917-18). Mr. Justice Beach, in arguing that the public policy argument has no merit
between states in the Union once the idea of extraterritoriality of law is eliminated had
this to say: "We must admit that extreme cases might be imagined in which the
mere enforcement of a foreign right would be an offense against good public
morals. But such cases cannot arise among the several states of the United States.
Their differences relate to the minor morals of expediency, and to debatable ques-
tions of internal policy. It would be an intolerable affectation of superior virtue for
the courts of one state to pretend that the mere enforcement of a right validly
created by the law of a sister state 'would be repugnant to good morals, would
lead to disturbance and disorganization of the local municipal law', or would be of
such evil example as to corrupt the jury or the public."
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done elsewhere. 5 The difficulty with this theory is that it assumes that
for every situation dealt with in the conflict of laws, there is always
only one law which has power to determine what legal consequences shall
be attached to the given situation. Thus, in each class of cases (tort,
contract, property, etc.), no other law than the "proper" law can be used.6
The conclusion necessarily drawn is that once a given right or legal
relation has been validly created by the appropriate law, its validity can-
not be called into question anywhere. Obviously, such a theory tends to
produce mechanical choice of law rules in the sense that once the forum
determines that the cause before it, let us say, is tort, the lex loci delictus
applies automatically. To escape some of the unjust results of this
mechanical jurisprudence which may arise in particular cases, the courts
reverted once again to the public policy concept, thus avoiding application
of a choice of law rule which the forum wished to avoid. As Paulsen
and Sovern have noted, 7 the objection of the forum is not to the content
of the foreign law, but rather, to its own choice of law rule. And rather
than change the rule, the court refuses on public policy grounds to
apply the law to which the rule makes reference. More significantly, they
have indicated that in the overwhelming number of cases which have
rejected foreign law on public policy grounds, the forum had some
important connection with the facts.8 Thus, another theory of choice of
law has been developing which professes to abandon the acceptance of
mechanical rules, and instead adopt an approach which seeks to determine
which state has the more "significant contacts" with the facts alleged, and
applies the law of that state accordingly.9 This has been the approach of
the New York courts recently, 10 and that used by the Second Circuit in
the Pearson case.
5. The vested rights theory attained respectability in Slater v. Mexican National
R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126, 24 S. Ct. 581, 583 (1904), where Mr. Justice Holmes re-
marked: "The theory of the foreign suit is that although the act complained of was sub-ject to no law having force in the forum, it gave rise to an obligation, an obligatio,
which, like other obligations, follows the person, and may be enforced wherever the
person may be found."
6. See discussion in Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws,
33 YAix L.J. 457, 459 (1924).
7. Paulsen & Sovern, Public Policy In The Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. Rv.
969,981 (1956).
8. Ibid.
9. See generally Cavers, A Critique of the Choice of Law Problem, 47 HARV.
L. Rtv. 173 (1933).
10. See, for example, Auten v. Auten, 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954),
where New York used the theory in a contract case to replace mechanical choice
of law rules which depended on the "place of contracting" or the "place of per-
formance." Other jurisdictions have also departed from the general conflicts
rules in order to take into account the interests of the state having significant con-
tact with the parties to the litigation, the most notable of them in the torts field
being: Grant v. McAuliffe, 41 Cal. 2d 859, 264 P.2d 944 (1953) ; Schmidt v. Driscoll
Hotel, Inc. 249 Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) ; Haumschild v. Continental
Casualty Co., 7 Wis. 2d 130, 95 N.W.2d 814 (1959).
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II.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS: CHARACTERIZATION.
The problem before a court in a conflicts case is to decide which
state's law (lex causae) is to govern the particular event or transaction.
Different sets of laws will be applied as the situation varies, the ultimate
choice depending on whether the case is characterized as tort, contract,
succession to movables, distribution of a decedent's estate, and so on.
Once the legal characterization is made, the court turns to the appropriate
conflicts rule which will indicate the territorial system of law to be
applied. Depending on the result the court may wish to reach (after
having considered the basic policies of the forum and having decided that
the given result will best effectuate those policies), the court will make
its characterization. The case of Dyke v. Erie Ry. Co." will serve as an
illustration. Plaintiff purchased a ticket in New York to travel on de-
fendant's railway from one point in New York to another point therein,
but the route passed through portions of New Jersey and Pennsylvania.
An accident occurred in Pennsylvania, a state which limited recovery to
$3000. The New York court allowed plaintiff to recover $35,000 on
the theory that lex locus contractus applied. If the suit had been con-
sidered based on the tort theory, the Pennsylvania limitation would have
applied. The court recognized that the damage limitation was a substantive
part of the Pennsylvania cause of action and would have had to be
enforced in the forum if a conflicts rule which pointed to Pennsylvania
law had been used. 12
The Dyke case, as most cases, illustrates that characterization is
in practice effected on the basis of the lex fori; that is, a court uses its
own internal law principles in characterizing an action before it. However,
a court must keep in mind that such a case contains foreign elements
and that the classification made must serve a conflict of laws function.
General principles which are more or less common to all legal systems
must therefore be considered. A concept such as "tort" or "contract"
must be given a wider meaning than it would have if no foreign elements
were involved.13
Once the classification of the cause of action has been made, it
remains for the court to apply the correct choice of law principle to
determine the lex causae. Some connecting factor will be used to de-
termine the proper conflicts rule to be applied. In a tort case, the
connecting factor is traditionally the place where the tortious act oc-
curred - the lex loci delictus. Although each state may use the same
connecting factor, and thus the same choice of law rule, there is some-
times a different interpretation given to the connecting factor so that
11. 45 N.Y. 113 (1871).
12. Id. at 118.
13. CHESHIRE, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (5th ed. 1957).
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there appears to be a conflict of conflicts rules. For example: A, standing
in state X, shoots B, standing in state Y. B sues A in state X for
assault and battery. State X must determine what law governs the
matter. The conflicts rules of states X and Y are identical - the
lex loci delictus applies. But assume that state X defines the lex loci
as the place where the injury occurred (state Y), and state Y defines it
as the place where the wrongful act was committed (state X). What
law does state X apply? The obvious answer is for X to use its own
interpretation. 14 However, X may then have to use Y's law which, let
us say, contains a damage limitation which is a substantive part of the
action. To avoid this, X can defer to the interpretation given by Y to
the connecting factor, which results in X using its own law without doing
violence to its conflicts rule.
Once the lex causae has been determined, a further problem may
arise as to which provisions of the particular legal system referred to
are substantive and which are procedural. Does the forum so deter-
mine by its own internal law provisions, or does it defer to its conflict
of laws rules and take into account the characterization which the lex causae
would apply to the particular provision? Obviously, since a foreign right
is being enforced, foreign law considerations must be taken into account.
A court should not arbitrarily determine that a particular provision of
foreign law is procedural merely to avoid the effect of the forum's choice of
law rule. The United States Supreme Court is the final arbiter even of these
problems of characterization. Thus, if a relevant substantive rule is
embodied in a foreign statute, and the forum decides that it is procedural,
full faith and credit has not been given to the foreign statute.15 A state
may not, under the guise of merely affecting the remedy, deny the
enforcement of claims otherwise within the protection of the full faith and
credit clause."" However, the line between substance and procedure is
not so clear that it can be said in any given case that a court has made
a clearly wrong or arbitrary determination. Moreover, the United States
Supreme Court has given very little guidance in this area. It has, however,
had occasion to consider a few cases involving statutes of limitation.
In Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe,'7 the Supreme
Court referred to the well established conflicts rule that if an action is
barred by the statute of limitations of the forum, no action can be main-
tained even though the action is not barred in the state where the
cause of action arose.' 8 Until recently it was thought that when a
14. This is the position taken by most writers on conflict of laws, and it is the
one adopted by the English courts. See Lorenzen, The Qualification, Classification,
or Characterization Problem in the Conflict of Laws, 50 YALE L.J. 743 (1941)
I&SZAThMENT, CONFLICr OF LAWS, § 7 (1934).
15. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 269 U.S. 178, 57 S. Ct. 129
(1936).
16. Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 55 S. Ct. 589 (1935).
17. 331 U.S. 586, 67 S. Ct. 1355 (1947).
18. See STUMBERG, CONFLICT ov LAWS 147 (1951); Lorenzen, Statutes of
Limitation and the Conflict of Laws, 28 YALi L.J. 492 (1919).
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foreign statute creating a right unknown to the common law had a period
of limitations included in it, the limitation was substantive. The United
States Supreme Court, as early as 1886, laid down this rule in The Harris-
burg: "Time has been made the essence of the right, and the right is
lost if the time is disregarded. The liability and the remedy are created
by the same statute, and the limitations of the remedy are therefore to
be treated as limitations of the right."'19 However, in Wells v. Simonds
Abrasive Co.,20 the question arose as to whether the forum can bar a
foreign death action based on a statute with a "built in" time limitation
when the forum's statute has run, even though the foreign limitation has
not. The Court affirmed Pennsylvania's dismissal of the action and its
failure to accredit the foreign "substantive" time limitation. It found no
reason to graft an exception on the general rule that the forum state
is not compelled to use the period of limitations of a foreign state,
whether or not there was involved a foreign statutory right unknown to
common law (as wrongful death statutes are). Of course, it would seem
that the case is not conclusive on the question of whether the forum can
entertain a suit on a foreign cause of action on which the built in
limitation has run. It is submitted that not only does The Harrisburg
govern that type of case, but also that due process and full faith and
credit would require the forum to dismiss a suit where the built in
limitation of the foreign statute which is relied upon has expired, thus
barring the remedy and the right in the foreign state where the cause of
action arose.
The United States Supreme Court has never had occasion to consider
whether damage limitations built into a foreign statute are entitled to
full faith and credit. However, it is generally conceded that provisions
regarding the measure and amount of damages are substantive, for only
a few cases have ever held such provisions procedural ;21 and it is cer-
tainly noteworthy that in each of those cases, the forum's own statute,
rather than the foreign statute, contained the damage limitation. It
would seem to be an entirely different matter when the foreign statute
which is being enforced contains the damage limitation. We have seen in
the statute of limitation cases that a forum is not bound to open up its
courts to a cause of action arising in another state when the time for
bringing such suits had already expired in the forum; and as was pointed
out in the Wells case, it makes no difference that the time limitation
built into the foreign action had not as yet run. It would seem that the
underlying reason is that a forum should not be bound to entertain
19. 119 U.S. 199, 214, 7 S. Ct. 140, 147 (1886).
20. 345 U.S. 514, 73 S. Ct. 856 (1953).
21. Armbruster v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co., 166 Iowa 155, 147 N.W. 337(1914); Higgins v. Central New England & W. R. Co., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N.E.
534 (1892). But see Gould v. Boston & M. R. Co., 282 Mass. 160, 184 N.E. 449(1933); Jackson v. Anthony, 282 Mass. 540, 155 N.E. 389 (1933); Wooden v.
Western N.Y. & Pa. R., 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050, 1051 (1891). See also, Cardozo's
opinion in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99; 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
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foreign actions when it would not entertain local actions arising on the
same kind of facts due to passage of time within which such actions must
be brought. The situation is clearly a matter of local judicial house-
keeping. Along the same line, it can also be said that where local law
limits the amount of damage recovery available to its citizens in a
particular type of case, it should also be able to limit the amount of
recovery by a foreign plaintiff on a similar foreign cause of action.
But whether the same reasoning holds true in the reverse situation
where the foreign law referred to contains the damage limitation involves
different considerations. The court is not asked in such a case to give a
greater remedy than it would give to its own citizens; rather, it is asked
to allow a defense which would have limited the amount of recovery
had the suit been brought where the cause of action arose. As has been
pointed out, it is doubtful that a court may entertain an action based on
a foreign cause of action -where the foreign statute of limitations has
extinguished both the remedy and the right; likewise, it follows that
where the right (and the remedy) is limited by the foreign statute, the
forum in applying that statute and enforcing that right should not
enlarge the right which the statute referred to has granted. Involved here
is more than the mere question of measure of damages, or such questions
as how to measure pain and suffering or the like; rather, the question is
the more substantial one going to the inherent nature of the legal right
involved.
III.
EXTENDING A WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE.
Bearing in mind the theoretical bases of the conflict of laws, and some
of the mechanics involved in arriving at a determination of what law
governs in a particular case, let us now see how New York conflicts
rules have been developed in case law up to and including the Pearson
case.
In torts, as in any other field, the common law of conflict of laws
developed as a territorial law. The law of the place (the territorial area)
in which an act occurs has traditionally been said to determine whether
the act is tortious. 22 All matters inherent in the act which determine its
legal characteristics are generally governed by this principle.23 New
York early accepted the principle as evidenced by Wooden v. Western
N. Y. & Pa. R. Co. 24 However, the concept of public policy was used
to dilute the effectiveness of the "vested right." In the Wooden case,
New York's wrongful death statute then embodied a strong public
policy against recovery above a certain amount; hence, even though
22. LEFLAR, CONFLICT OF LAWS 207 (1959); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS§§ 377-383 (1934).
23. Ibid.
24. 126 N.Y. 10, 26 N.E. 1050 (1891).
368 [VOL. 8
7
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
SPRING 1963]
the foreign statute was the basis of the claim, the statute of the forum
was used to limit recovery. However, in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,2 5
Judge Cardozo concluded that the authority of the Wooden case "does not
extend beyond the specific point decided," viz., that plaintiff was a local
resident and therefore limited by the local policy. In Loucks, the highest
court of New York reversed a lower court's decision to dismiss an action
for wrongful death founded on Massachusetts' wrongful death statute,
the lower court having found that the statute was not only penal, 26 but
was so dissimilar from New York's statute as not to be entitled to
enforcement in the forum.27 The New York Court of Appeals found
the statute not penal under rules of private international law, since it did
not purport to award a penalty to the state, but rather, to an individual
who had suffered a private wrong. Therefore, it was held that public
policy does not prohibit the assumption of jurisdiction by New York
courts, and mere differences of remedy are immaterial. Only violations of
a "fundamental principle of justice" were deemed to warrant dismissal
of a claim based on foreign law.2 8 And it was stated that "the funda-
mental policy of New York's wrongful death statute is that there shall
be some atonement for the wrong. '29
In 1961, the New York courts were faced with a similar case in
Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.80 There, the Loucks decision was
followed to the extent that New York accepted jurisdiction of an action
based on the Massachusetts statute. However, while granting that a
plaintiff must look to the foreign statute for the basis of his claim, the
spirit of Loucks was rejected when the court held in a dictum that
New York policy prevents the application of the Massachusetts damage
limitation. The case had arisen on a wrongful death claim brought by
the administrator of a decedent who had been a domiciliary of New York,
and had bought and paid for his ticket in New York, and who was killed
when defendant's airliner crashed and burned near Nantucket, Massa-
chusetts. An additional cause of action in the nature of contract had been
25. 224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
26. "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another." The Antelope,
10 Wheat. (23 U.S.) 66, 123 (1825) ; RXSTArZMENT, CoNVLICT' or LAWS § 427 (1934).
27. Before the public policy argument came into its own, the courts used to
refuse to enforce death act claims of a sister state if the foreign death act did not
meet the "substantial similarity" test, i.e., the forum would decline to accept juris-
diction of a cause which arose under a foreign death act which substantially con-
flicted with the terms of the forum's act. E.g., Leonard v. Columbia Steam Nay.
Co., 84 N.Y. 48 (1881). See generally, Paulsen & Sovern, Public Policy in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. Rjv. 969 (1956).
28. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N.Y. 99, 111, 120 N.E. 198, 202 (1918).
29. Ibid. Previously in this comment, it was said that the forum could refuse
to give any credit to a foreign statute when any substantive provision of that
statute conflicted with fundamental public policy of the forum. The Loucks case
holds that New York cannot refuse to accept jurisdiction of a wrongful death claim
on policy grounds. What is meant is that New York cannot summarily dismiss an
action based on a foreign statute leaving plaintiff no remedy in New York. How-
ever, the decision in no way conflicts with the writer's view that New York may
extend its own statute and allow recovery on it rather than the foreign statute when
adequate contacts are present.
30. 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526 (1961).
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pleaded, but the lower court had dismissed it. The appropriateness of
this dismissal was the sole issue on appeal to the Court of Appeals; and
that court unanimously affirmed the lower court's dismissal on the ground
that wrongful death actions derive solely from statute and that a pas-
senger's contract action for damages does not survive. The court stated
that the "contract" action sounded in tort, and allowed only the tort
action under the Massachusetts statute. However, the court went fur-
ther and pronounced in a dictum that New York's public policy, as
expressed in its constitution,3 1 would prevent application of that part of
the Massachusetts statute which limits damages to $15,000.32
A concurring opinion in Kilberg cited Faron v. Eastern Airlines, Inc., 33
to support the court's holding that the action was governed by the applicable
law of torts, even though the allegations cited a breach of the contract. In
Faron the court had also sustained a defense based on the Connecticut death
statute limiting damages to $20,000. Another case had been brought in a
federal court of New York for wrongful death arising out of the same facts
from which the Faron litigation had arisen. In that case, Maynard v.
Eastern Airlines, Inc.,34 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals sustained
the district court's judgment limiting damages to $20,000, holding that
under New York's death statute recovery may not be had for accidents
occurring beyond the borders of the state (citing Loucks). The court in
Kilberg agreed that the New York statute could not be extended, but
thought that "modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to
subject the travelling citizen of this state to the varying laws of other
states through and over which they move."'3 5 The dictum, then, established
this conflicts rule: a foreign damage limitation will not be enforced against
a New York citizen suing in a New York court for wrongful death, but a
citizen is still required to look to the foreign statute as the basis for his claim.
The conflicts rule, no doubt, is a good one, for it allows for a just result.
However, it ignores another important rule, which is, that once a forum
determines to use foreign law, it must apply every substantive provision
of that law. If the forum requires the claim to be based on the foreign
31. This public policy against limitation of damages has been embraced in New
York's constitution since 1894: "The right of action now existing to recover damages
for injuries resulting in death shall never be abrogated; and the amount recoverable
shall not be subject to any statutory limitation." N.Y. CONSTr., art. I, § 16, N.Y.
CONST. (1894), art. I, § 18.
32. MASS. GnN. LAWs ANN. ch. 299, § 2 (Supp. 1960) : "Damages for death by
negligence of common carrier. If the proprietor of a common carrier of passengers
. .. causes the death of a passenger, he or it shall be liable in damages in the sum
of not less than two thousand nor more than fifteen thousand dollars, to be assessed
with reference to the degree of culpability of the defendant or of his servants or
agents, and recovered and distributed as provided in section one, and to the use
of the persons and in the proportions therein specified." The statute was amended
in 1961, raising the upper limit to $20,000. MAss. GMN. LAWs ANN. ch. 229, § 2
(Supp. 1961). And the statute has once again been amended, effective Jan. 1,
1963, raising the minimum recovery to $3000 and the maximum to $30,000. Mass.
Acts 1962, c. 306.
33. 193 Misc. 395, 84 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1948).
34. 178 F.2d 139 (2d Cir. 1949).
35. 9 N.Y. 2d 34, 39, 172 N.E.2d 526, 52 (1961).
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statute, it cannot arbitrarily deny full faith and credit to any substantive
provision in that statute.3 6 The Massachusetts act does more than touch
or affect a matter of procedure. It provides for a penal and limited
statutory liability which cannot be transformed into a compensatory and
unlimited one like that of the New York act under any concept of "proce-
dure." 37 A mere label of procedure is inadequate to enable a state to hurdle
the full faith and credit clause. 38 New York's own courts have always looked
to the foreign state's treatment of a particular provision to determine its
nature ;39 there is no reason why it can or should abandon this international
conflicts rule now. Public policy concepts should not be used to prevent
undesirable effects of the forum's own conflicts rules. If, as it is claimed,
New York has significant contacts to enable it to ignore a substantive
damage limitation of a foreign statute, isn't it also true that those same
contacts should enable New York to ignore the foreign law completely?
That is, it is far less questionable under the full faith and credit clause
for the forum to reasonably determine that its own statute governs the
matter, than to make a determination that foreign law governs ex-
cept for those substantive provisions of foreign law which the forum
dislikes. Though the writer has found no authority for this position in the
United States, largely because the courts have always applied the foreign
damage limitation, there are two English cases on the point. In Davidsson
v. Hill,40 a Norwegian sailmaker was drowned when a collision occurred
on the high seas involving a British ship and a Norwegian barque owing
to the negligent navigation of the former vessel by the defendants' ser-
vants. The decedent had previously lived with his family in Norway.
The court allowed his widow to bring an action under the English Fatal
Accidents Act to recover compensation for herself and her six children.
Though the death had not occurred in England, it is clear that the English
court was willing to extend its statute and allow a foreign citizen to
recover under it against a British citizen even though the death had
occurred elsewhere than in England. Of course, some of the force of
the decision as authority for a court in the United States is lost due
to the fact that the collision occurred on the high seas and not in
another state having a wrongful death statute. Thus, it would seem that
a state court would use the decision, if at all, only in a situation where a
death occurred in a state or country having no death statute, and one of
the parties to the action is a domiciliary of the forum. However, a recent
decision from the High Court of. Australia would seem to lend even
greater weight to the matter. In Koop v. Bebb, 41 the father of the infant
36. Broderick v. Rosner, supra note 16.
37. See Judge Friendly's dissent in Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 309
F.2d 553, 568 (2d Cir. 1962).
38. Id. at 569. Also, Broderick v. Rosner, supra note 16.
39. E.g., Fitzpatrick v. International Railway Co., 252 N.Y. 127, 169 N.E.
112 (1929).
40. [1901] 2 K.B. 606.
41. (1952), 84 C.L.R. 629 (High Court of Australia).
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plaintiffs had been injured when the lorry in which he was riding as
passenger overturned due to defendant's negligent driving. The accident
happened in the State of New South Wales; and the consequent death
occurred in the state of Victoria. The infants sought damages under the
Victorian Wrongs Act which was the local equivalent of the English
Fatal Accidents Acts, and, like those Acts, was not expressly confined to
acts occurring within the jurisdiction. A lower court had refused the
infants' claim, holding that the Victorian act was confined to wrongful
acts occurring within the jurisdiction. The High Court reversed on the
theory that since the father would have been entitled to sue the de-
fendant in Victoria for injuring him by negligence, the plaintiffs should
likewise be entitled to maintain their wrongful death action under the
Victorian Act.
In Finnegan v. Cementation Ltd.,42 a workman employed by the
defendant British Company died six days after sustaining injuries while
engaged in demolition work in Ireland. His widow brought an action in
England to recover damages under the English Acts. The court dis-
missed her claim for technical reasons, but no member of the court ap-
pears to have thought that her action based on the English Acts was
ill-founded or that she should have pursued her cause of action under
Irish law.
Applying these principles to the Kilberg case, the reasoning of the
court might well have been as follows: New York public policy is op-
posed to limitations on the amount of damages recoverable by one of
its own citizens suing for wrongful death. If a plaintiff is required to
found his action on the Massachusetts statute then a problem will arise
as to what law governs the characterization of the damage limitation
of that statute as either substantive or procedural. New York conflicts
rules require the court to give effect to the meaning which Massachusetts
has placed on the provision. 8 And, indeed, a look at the Massachusetts
statute shows beyond question that it is penal and limited, and cannot be
reasonably termed compensatory and unlimited. Therefore, New York con-
flicts rules would require the enforcement of the entire statute if it is going
to be used at all. Moreover, there would probably be a serious constitutional
question involving the full faith and credit clause. But, since New York does
have significant contacts with the case, plaintiffs could well be allowed to
plead the New York statute and found their cause of action on it. Thus,
New York will not have to use a public policy argument which it had never
used in previous wrongful death cases involving damage limitations. And
New York will not become involved in the intricacies of the substance-proce-
dure legerdemain. Of course, under this approach, foreign law is not totally
ignored. New York will still look to Massachusetts law to determine
if the facts which gave rise to the, injury and death constituted a tort
42. [1953] 1 Q.B. 688 (C.A.).
43. See Bournias v. Atlantic Maritime Co., Ltd., 220 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1955).
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or wrong. And if Massachusetts law determines that defendant committed
a wrongful act, he should have no cause to complain of unfairness, for,
after all, his wrongful act was responsible for the death. It may be argued
that such a view encourages forum shopping and subjects a defendant to
varying degrees of monetary liability depending on where he is sued.
Perhaps, then, the view expounded herein should apply only to airliner
cases or other interstate transportation cases. In these cases, where the
airline or other facility operates in many states, it can have only limited
expectations that the law of its home state will be applied in any given
crash. It is highly unlikely, also, that its insurance coverage is so limited
as not to afford coverage of suits wherever they might arise. For these
and other reasons which are usually not present in the ordinary wrongful
death case involving individual plaintiffs and defendants, the writer would
thus consider the airliner type of case as sui generis and would confine the
suggestions offered in this comment to that type of case only.
The situation in the Pearson case was identical to that in Kilberg.
However, the Pearson litigation arose in a federal court in New York;
and the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the motion of defendant, Northeast Airlines, Inc., to limit
recovery to the maximum permitted under the Massachusetts statute,
Judge McGohey ruling that he was obliged to apply the dictum of the
New York Court of Appeals in Kilberg to the effect that the Massachusetts
limitation would not be enforced against a New York citizen suing in
a New York court. He also ruled that damages should not be measured
by the "degree of culpability" as required by the Massachusetts statute,
but by "New York's standard of the pecuniary damage resulting to the
beneficiaries from the death."4 4 On appeal from these rulings, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the ruling based on
the Kilberg dictum violated the full faith and credit clause of the federal
constitution (Art. IV, section 1) since the source of the obligation was
the foreign law, and the defendant was entitled to the benefit of whatever
conditions and limitations the foreign law creates. 45 The court further
stated that "there is no decision by the Supreme Court that the failure
to enforce the limitation of a foreign wrongful death statute is consistent
with the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution. A majority of
this court holds that it is not."'46 However, Judge Kaufman dissented so
vigorously that the court granted a rehearing en banc, and subsequently
reversed its original decision, adopting as the majority opinion Judge
Kaufman's original dissent along with several additional considerations. 47
The heart of the decision was that a federal court in diversity is obliged to
apply not only a state's domestic law, but also its conflicts law ;48 though
44. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 539, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
45. 307 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1962).
46. Id. at 136.
47. 309 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1962).
48. Klaxon v. Stentor Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941); Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938). A federal court may not
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the ruling in Kilberg was only a dictum, nevertheless, it "was a proper
exercise of that state's power to develop conflict of laws doctrine. '49
The main problem the court was faced with lay in squaring the decision
with the full faith and credit clause. The court had to review and
distinguish three types of cases involving full faith and credit: work-
mens' compensation cases, statute of limitations cases, and three wrongful
death cases which have arisen under the full faith and credit clause.
The most significant case involving statutes of limitations was Wells
v. Simonds Abrasive Co.,50 discussed previously in this comment. The
majority in Pearson read the Wells case to support its view that limita-
tions on damages are mere procedural provisions, for, as it said, there is
no valid distinction between limitations on time and limitations on dollar
amounts. In fact, the majority stated that "implicit in the Wells decision
was a holding that Pennsylvania could apply its own statute of limitations
even if it were longer than that provided in the Alabama statute." 51 As
previously pointed out, this writer would agree with the statement to the
extent that a forum may apply its own statute of limitations to a right
created in another jurisdiction where only the remedy is barred, but
it certainly would seem that where both the remedy and the right are
barred in that jurisdiction, the forum would be acting wholly unrea-
sonably in allowing recovery on the foreign cause of action. It is felt
that the United States Supreme Court did not intend to categorically label
statutes of limitations as procedural for all possible cases. Likewise, it would
seem that the majority in Pearson is wrong in seeking to label damage
limitations as merely procedural. In ordinary cases, there would seem
to be no compelling reason to treat damages as substantive, except for the
fact that it has been considered, since Slater v. Mexican National
R.R. Co.,52 and Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Babcock,5 3 that measure of
damages is substantive. Since these cases were not constitutional law
cases, there is no requirement that they be followed. In fact, the court in
Kilberg professedly abandoned reliance on them. But where damage
limitations are built into a statute, the matter would seem to be more
than ordinary, and the substance-procedure dichotomy may not be
used so lightly. Labels must be replaced with sound reasoning; and
sound reasoning would seem to require a finding that such limitations are
substantive.
exercise an independent judgment, or follow general principles in selecting the law
of the case, unless there is no ascertainable rule on the point in the forum. See 1
MOORE, FEDERAL PRNCTICE ff 0.311, at 3405 (2d ed. 1961). But, Erie compels adher-
ence to state conflicts rules only if valid, and their validity depends on whether full
faith and credit is given to the foreign law, which is a federal question to be
determined by the federal court deciding -the case. 1 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.311, at 3412-13 (2d ed. 1961).
49. 309 F.2d 553, 556 (2d Cir. 1962).
50. Supra, note 20.
51. 309 F.2d 553, 559 (2d Cir. 1962).
52. 194 U.S. 120, 24 S. Ct. 581 (1904).
53. 154 U.S. 190, 14 S. Ct. 978 (1894).
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Turning now to wrongful death cases which the United States Supreme
Court has had occasion to review, three recent cases stand out. In Hughes
v. Fetter,54 the Wisconsin court refused to entertain an action based on the
Illinois wrongful death statute on the ground that Wisconsin's own
death act established a policy against sustaining suits brought under death
acts of other states. The Supreme Court, in holding that Wisconsin could
not close its doors to the cause of action created by the Illinois act,
pointed out that "Wisconsin has no real antagonism against wrongful
death suits in general," and in the course of the opinion stated:
We have recognized however that Full Faith and Credit does not
automatically compel a forum state to subordinate its own statutory
policy to a conflicting public act of another state; rather, it is for
this court to choose in each case between the competing public
policies involved. . . . The clash of interests in cases of this type
has usually been described as a conflict between the public policies
of two or more states. The more basic conflict involved in the
present appeal, however, is as follows: on the one hand is the strong
unifying principle embodied in the Full Faith and Credit Clause
looking toward maximum enforcement in each state of the obligations
or rights created or recognized by the statutes of sister states: on
the other hand is the policy of Wisconsin . . . against permitting
Wisconsin courts to entertain this wrongful death action. 55
The Court, in a footnote, indicated that "The present case is not one
where Wisconsin, having entertained appellant's lawsuit, chose to apply
its own instead of Illinois' statute to measure the substantive rights
involved. This distinguishes the present case from those where we have
said that 'Prima facie every state is entitled to enforce in its own courts
its own statutes, lawfully enacted!' "56 Judge Kaufman states that he
believes this passage from Hughes clearly implies that prima facie it would
have been constitutional if Wisconsin applied provisions of its own wrongful
death statute to the out of state accident involved there. He would seem
to be correct to this extent: Wisconsin could have extended its statute,
either by legislative enactment or judicial interpretation to allow suit
under it, provided it had enough "contacts" with the case. Most likely,
this is what the Court in Hughes intimated in its footnote. The court
did take the trouble to indicate that "the present case is not one lacking a
close relationship with the state; for not only were the appellant, the
decedent and the individual defendants all residents of Wisconsin, but also,
appellant was appointed administrator and the corporate defendant was
created under Wisconsin law."15 7 Moreover, the Alaska Packers case cited
in the Court's footnote would seem to add further weight to this argu-
ment, since, in that case, the court applied its own rather than the
54. 341 U.S. 609, 71 S. Ct. 980 (1951).
55. 341 U.S. 609, 611, 71 S. Ct. 980, 982 (1951).
56. Ibid.
57. Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609, 613, 71 S. Ct. 980, 983 (1951).
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foreign state's compensation act. In First National Bank of Chicago v.
United Airlines,58 the Court merely had to reiterate its holding in Hughes,
since the Illinois statute there involved was similar to the Wisconsin
statute construed by Hughes. Thus, Hughes and First National Bank
rest on the narrow point that in each of those cases the forum laid an
uneven hand on causes of action arising within and without the forum
state. They do not attempt to define the limits to which a state may go
in its development of conflicts rules, but rather, they indicate that there
are certain minimum requirements which must be met in a conflict of laws
case, and it is for the Supreme Court to decide in each case whether they
have been met.
The workmen's compensation cases, more so than any other Supreme
Court cases, seem to support this writer's conclusions regarding the
possibility of extending the forum's death statute in the class of cases
mentioned.
In Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,59 it was held that New
Hampshire had improperly denied full faith and credit to a Vermont
public act when it had ignored the exclusive remedy provided by the
Vermont workmen's compensation act and had allowed tort recovery for
a death suffered in New Hampshire at a time when the deceased had
been working under a contract of employment entered into in Vermont.
The decision has since been discredited insofar as it purported to de-
termine the governing workmen's compensation law, but the idea that
the full faith and credit clause is a limitation, along with the due process
clause, upon state courts in their solution of choice of law problems, still
persists.60 In Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial Accident Commis-
sion,61 California was the place of contract and the U.S. Supreme Court
allowed California's award under its own act, though the employment
contract had specified that only the Alaska act could be applied. Thus, it
seems that the Supreme Court has approved a characterization of work-
men's compensation cases as being in the nature of contract, with the
law of the lex loci contractus to govern. But the Court also indicated in
that case that for purposes of full faith and credit, torts generally are
subject to the usual choice of law rules.62 Again, in Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission,6 3 California was upheld
after applying its own compensation act. There, the fact that the plaintiff
had been injured in California and that that state's law afforded funds
with which physicians and hospitals could be paid, was deemed to justify
58. 342 U.S. 396, 72 S. Ct. 421 (1952).
59. 286 U.S. 145, 52 S. Ct. 571 (1932).
60. LEFLAR, op. cit. supra note 22, at 153.
61. 294 U.S. 532, 55 S. Ct. 518 (1935).
62. 294 U.S. at 541, 55 S. Ct. at 521. The court pointed out that "while similar
power to control the legal consequences of a tortious act committed elsewhere has
been denied, . . . the liability under Workmens' Compensation Acts is not for a
tort."
63. 306 U.S. 493, 59 S. Ct. 629 (1939).
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California's application of its own act to protect its doctors and hospitals
from nonpayment. Finally, the Clapper decision was, in effect, overruled
in Carroll v. Lanza,6 4 wherein it was held that Arkansas could give tort
recovery to a Missouri resident injured while working in Arkansas. Rely-
ing on the Pacific Employers case, the Court found no reason why the
place of injury could not allow tort recovery since it was allowed to give
compensation recoveries under its own law.
It must be noted that the Clapper case is still good law insofar as
its interpretation of the full faith and credit clause is concerned, viz.,
a state, having been referred to the lex causae may not ignore the ex-
clusive remedy provided by the statute relied upon. The majority in
Pearson dismissed the workmen's compensation cases as being sui generis,
which, perhaps, they are insofar as they allow suit on the local statute
even though the plaintiff was injured while working in another state;
but they are certainly not to be disregarded as having nothing to do with
full faith and credit considerations which arise in other cases.
Taking these cases, together with the English cases heretofore dis-
cussed, it would seem that it is constitutionally sound, as well as sound
conflicts law, to allow a domiciliary of the forum state to invoke the
forum's own statute on wrongful death, rather than to always require
that a plaintiff look to the death statute of the lex loci delictus as
the basis for his cause of action. And this is so, if not in every wrongful
death case involving foreign elements, at least in those cases involving
interstate transportation where the place of injury or death is often
entirely fortuitous.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
From the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court herein discussed, it
would appear safe to draw the following general conclusions:
(1) A state may refuse to entertain a foreign based tort action only
if its public policy is fundamentally opposed to the specific type of
action. A state is not obliged to supply a tribunal to litigate
foreign claims when its own courts are not competent to try
similar fact situations arising within the forum.
(2) A state may refuse to hear a case in which, even though its policy
is not expressly against such actions, the statute of limitations on
similar actions arising within the forum state would bar such ac-
tions. The rationale is similar to that behind Rule 1.
(3) Once a state decides to look to the foreign statute creating the
cause of action, it must give full faith and credit to every sub-
stantive provision of that statute. It cannot arbitrarily label a
64. 349 U.S. 408, 75 S. Ct. 804 (1955).
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provision "procedure" in order to escape its own conflicts rule
and thereby apply its own law, when it appears beyond doubt that
the provision in question is considered by the foreign state as
substantive for all purposes. That is, a court cannot give some
faith and credit - it must give full faith and credit to that public
act.
(4) A state may extend its own similar statute so as to allow suit
upon it rather than upon the foreign statute, provided it has signifi-
cant contacts with the persons involved to enable it to do so con-
sistently with due process. The Supreme Court has shown a
willingness to go along with a state's abandonment of ordinary
conflicts rules in situations where the jural contact (e.g., lex loci
delictus) depends on relatively fortuitous events.65
Accepting the above generalizations as stating the permissible areas
in which a state can move freely without violating any clause of the
Constitution, and thus, assuming that the foregoing analyses of the cases
are correct, it is submitted that the Pearson case, while reaching a correct
and desirable result, is nevertheless not to be approved in the means or
ratio decidendi implemented to reach the desired result. That the result
was correct is beyond question when one considers that the case dealt
with a special type of situation, viz., common carrier or airline accidents
which may occur anywhere along a given route. There is a need for
special rules when one considers the vast air transportation network
centered in New York and other large cities. As pointed out in Kilberg:
An air traveler from New York may in a flight of a few hours' dura-
tion pass through several . . . commonwealths. His plane may meet
with disaster in a state he never intended to cross but into which the
plane has flown because of bad weather or other unexpected de-
velopments, or an airplane's catastrophic descent may begin in one
state and end in another. The place of injury becomes entirely
fortuitous. 66
What better policy reason could justify New York in applying its own
wrongful death statute for the benefit of domiciliaries? Surely New York
should not have to apply foreign law to such a situation. The majority in
Pearson agreed wholeheartedly; but in its haste to accomplish this
result, it seems to have ignored a constitutional obstacle. Of course,
the majority in Pearson could only go by New York law, and not some
independent federal law. Applying the rule laid down in Kilberg, (al-
though it was only a dictum, it was nevertheless construed as part of
New York's common law of conflict of laws) the court was forced to
look to Massachusetts for the basis of the right. The decision could
65. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 82 S. Ct. 585 (1962).
66. 9 N.Y.S.2d at 39, 172 N.E.2d at 527.
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not be based on a contract characterization, for all seven of the judges
in Kilberg had repudiated that; and, of course, it was rightly felt that
New York had such interests involved that it would be unjust to limit
recovery under the Massachusetts statute. Judge Friendly, in his
dissenting opinion, summed it up in this way: "I see nothing in the
Federal Constitution that would prevent the Legislature of New York
from amending its wrongful death act to include the death in a sister
state of a New York resident travelling on a flight from New York, on a
ticket purchased in New York, or the courts of New York from now
reading its wrongful death act to cover such a case. '" 67 The majority,
time and again, repeated its stand against "mechanical choice of law
rules," against "freezing into constitutional mandate a choice of law rule
derived from the Ice Age of Conflict of Laws jurisprudence," and against
"resurrecting the Vested Rights doctrine," and the like. However, as Judge
Friendly shrewdly observed, its fears were needless when one considers
the various other ways that New York could validly have arrived at the
results it did. As he said, the majority seems to have been "supporting
itself with ghosts of its own conjuring."6
James F. Kipp
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- ENFORCEMENT OF PRISON DISCIPLINE
AND ITS EFFECT UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THOSE
IMPRISONED.
The purpose of this comment is to examine the extent to which certain
rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution to free individuals in
our society are applicable to those who have been convicted of a crime
and have been duly sentenced to incarceration in a state or federal
penitentiary. Those certain rights are freedom from cruel and unusual
punishment, freedom of speech, and freedom to maintain and practice a
religion. The possibility of redress for their infringement, to the extent to
which they are found to exist, will also be considered.
I.
CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES APPLICABLE To PRISONERS.
A.
Freedom from Cruel and Unusual Punishment.
The most cursory examination of penal history reveals that prisons
were no sooner established than punishments were invented to enforce disci-
67. 309 F.2d 553, 564 (2d Cir. 1962).
68. Ibid.
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pline within the institution.' To argue with the expediency of this develop-
ment would be foolish. The necessity for a disciplinary system with sanctions
exists to this day. Upon review, it is the harsh quality of the devices
and procedures which were employed early to insure obedience which
seems repugnant.2  The prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment,
found in the eighth amendment,3 was prompted, at least in part, by the
reaction against the barbarities which had for years pervaded the ad-
ministration of the English and American criminal law. 4 The eighth
amendment was directed also against punishments which were grossly
disproportionate to the crimes committed., The problem of what is a
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the amendment has
arisen most frequently in cases involving sentences meted out by the
courts. 6 However, the prisoner is not primarily concerned with the
standards which have developed for determining whether a court ordered
punishment is cruel or unusual. The punishments inflicted upon him
within the prison, which are usually of more immediate concern, are
imposed not by the courts, but by the prison administrators. It is their
duty to maintain, restrain, and if possible to reform the prisoner. It has
been held that in performing these functions the officers may regulate
his conduct in any reasonable manner.7
The courts in the past have not been disposed to probe too deeply
into the question of what constitutes reasonable methods of regulation. This
reflects a hesitancy to interfere with the internal discipline of the prison.
In the case of Price v. Johnson," the United States Supreme Court pointed
out that "Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or
limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the
considerations underlying our penal system." Armed with this basic
philosophy, the courts, wherever possible, have for years avoided setting
standards for "reasonable" conduct on the part of prison officials. A
case in point is Stroud v. Swope.9 There, Robert Stroud, the famous
1. GILLIN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 273 (rev. ed. 1935).
2. The use of whipping, partial starvation, strait-jackets, ducking in cold water,
and "gagging" were among some of the methods used to maintain discipline.
3. "Excessive bail shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel
and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CoNs'. amend. VIII.
4. Hemans v. United States, 163 F.2d 228, 237 (6th Cir. 1947), cert. denied,
332 U.S. 801, 68 S. Ct. 152 (1947). See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 351-
353, 30 S. Ct. 544, 551 (1909).
5. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 544 (1909); Fulwood v.
Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962) ; State v. Evens, 73 Idaho 50, 245
P.2d 788 (1952); State v. Kimbrough, 212 S.C. 348, 46 S.E.2d 273 (1948).
6. See e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 78 S. Ct. 590 (1958); Ginsberg v.
United States, 96 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1953) (imprisonment) ; Matter of Candito, 31
Hawaii 982 (1931) (death penalty).
7. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822, 73 S. Ct. 20 (1952) ; Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 829, 72 S. Ct. 53 (1951) ; McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468,
130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
8. 334 U.S. 266, 285, 68 S. Ct. 1049, 1060 (1948).
9. 187 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 829, 72 S. Ct. 53
(1951).
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"Birdman of Alcatraz," sought to restrain the warden from interfering
with his efforts to secure the publication of books written in prison, and
to order him to permit "a reasonable correspondence" to further his
outside business enterprise. In refusing to take such action the court
declared:
If we assumed the authority to make an order of the character here
proposed, it would certainly impose upon the courts the further duty
of deciding the issue of "reasonableness" in the event appellant and
the prison warden were hereafter unable to agree as to the various
phases of "business activity" carried on by appellant and the scope of
his correspondence relative thereto. We reject the argument that any
such burden of supervision may lawfully be imposed upon, or assumed
by, the courts. [Emphasis added]. 10
Although the courts have hesitated to act where the conduct of
prison officials has appeared connected with maintaining internal discipline,
it is well settled that the power of prison authorities is not unlimited.
The prisoner has the right to be free from needless brutality, and when
such brutality has occurred the cruel and unusual punishment clause has
afforded the convict legal relief." The rationale for granting such relief
was concisely stated in the case of Coffin v. Reichard.12 Coffin was con-
victed of a crime and placed on probation. The probation subsequently
was revoked and the prisoner was ordered to serve his original sentence.
While being held incommunicado in the State Hospital at Lexington,
Kentucky, he was coerced into making a confession concerning an inci-
dent which was alleged to have occurred while he was on probation. The
court allowed the prisoner to file a writ of habeas corpus and held that:
A prisoner retains all the rights of an ordinary citizen except those
expressly, or by necessary implication taken from him by law. While
the law does take his liberty and imposes a duty of servitude and
observance of discipline for his regulation and that of other prisoners,
it does not deny his right to personal security against unlawful in-
vasion.13
In the recent case of Fulwood v. Clemmer,14 a court for the first
time openly acknowledged a responsibility to establish standards to guide
prison administrators toward "reasonable" treatment of prisoners. This
case involved alleged religious discrimination on the part of prison
officials in refusing to allow a group of inmates to hold religious ser-
vices. The prisoners belonged to a sect known as the Black Muslims.
The warden's decision to forbid the Muslims to hold their services was
10. Id. at 851.
11. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887,
65 S. Ct. 1568 (1945) ; State v. Carpenter, 221 N.C. 229, 56 S.E.2d 713 (1949).
12. 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887, 65 S. Ct. 1568
(1945).
13. Id. at 445.
14. 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
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based upon his belief that the sect taught racial hatred, and that such
teaching was likely to create a disturbance in the prison.15 After the
refusal a series of informal meetings was held on a recreation field in the
prison. At one of the meetings the petitioner spoke of the beliefs and
practices of the Muslims and made some derogatory references to the
white race. He was punished by being placed in a control cell.', For
the next two years he was not allowed to return to the general inmate
population, but was kept in the control cell or in a special treatment
unit cell. 17 In finding that such treatment was unreasonable and amounted
to cruel and unusual punishment, the court used as a standard the physical,
mental and emotional background of the prisoner in the institution, as
well as the nature of the rule broken.' 8 It would seem that the court
properly applied standards which were based upon activity within the
institution. Presumably, if a murderer and a thief break a prison regu-
lation, their punishments should not be differentiated on the basis of the
crimes for which they were imprisoned. Although the definitive statement
of this standard is recent, the courts have been developing this approach
gradually over the last half century.
Certain types of punishments have been customarily administered to
maintain prison discipline. Solitary confinement is not of itself con-
stitutionally objectionable,' though such confinement is unlawful if pro-
longed without sufficient reason.2 0 Convicts who are constant disciplinary
problems may be committed to a segregated wing.2 1 Limitations on diet
as a punishment are permitted,22 but these also must be reasonable.2 3
Corporal punishment has always been a widely used mode of main-
taining convict discipline. The older cases allowed whipping,24 while the
more recent ones have indicated that beatings by hand or rubber hose
15. Id. at 373.
16. A control cell is a cell in a special building. It is approximately eight feet
by twelve feet, with a stone floor and stone walls on three sides. There is no
window and the single artificial light is controlled from outside the cell. There is
no furniture of any kind in the cell; a mattress is placed on the floor at ten o'clock
at night and is removed at six o'clock in the morning. There is no wash basin and
the toilet in most cases is not flushable from inside the cell. An inmate of a
control cell is allowed no reading matter, no exercise, no visitors, no mail, unless of
an emergency nature, and only an occasional shave and shower. The inmate is
allowed to wear only coveralls and shoes without laces and is placed on a restrictive
diet of 2000 calories daily. Id. at 378.
17. A special treatment unit (S. T. U.) cell is one in which a number of
restrictions are imposed on the-prisoner, but the conditions are not as harsh as in a
control cell. Id. at 379.
18. Id. at 379.
19. Matter of Candito, 31 Hawaii 982, 995 (1931) (dictum).
20. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962); See Gordon v.
Garrson, 77 F. Supp. 477 (E. D. Il. 1948); Howard v. State, 23 Ariz. 433, 237
Pac. 203 (1925).
21. McBride v. McCorkle, 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
22. See Matter of Candito, 31 Hawaii 982, 995 (1931). Cf. The John Winthroup,
182 Fed. 380 (9th Cir. 1910) (bread and water was considered a proper punishment
for seamen).
23. See cases cited note 22, supra.
24. Matter of Candito, 31 Hawaii 982 (1931); State v. Revis, 193 N.C. 192,
136 S.E. 346 (1927).
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constitute cruel and unusual punishment.25 No doubt some corporal
punishment can still be inflicted on prisoners but the amount must be
reasonable in light of the standards set forth in the Fulwood case. 20
Torture had long been a common method of maintaining discipline;
but whenever such cases have been brought before the state or federal
courts the methods used have always been held constitutionally un-
lawful. 27
In addition to disciplinary measures, other aspects of prison life have
been attacked as cruel and unusual, but with little success. Necessary
medical tests and treatments, though painful, have been upheld. 28 In
several cases prisoners have contended that internment in the prison
itself was inherently cruel and unusual punishment. In Ex Parte
Pickens,29 an inmate sought by a writ of habeas corpus to be released
from a local jail in Anchorage, Alaska, claiming cruel and unusual
punishment by virtue of the unsanitary and overcrowded conditions of
the jail. The court, although admitting the existence of such conditions,
refused to find that they amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. But
the court's decision appears based more on an unwillingness to let a
convicted man go free than on a belief that the constitutional rights of the
prisoners were not being violated.30 In another case,3' a prisoner com-
plained of her transfer to a woman's death cell at Sing Sing. She asserted
that she was transferred for the purpose of "breaking" her into confessing
the crime for which she had been convicted and that her incarceration
amounted to cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of the eighth
amendment.3 2 In denying relief the court relied on a federal statute
which permits the U.S. Attorney General to choose any available state
or federal institution for the confinement of those convicted of a crime
against the United States.33 The court also found that, although the cell
was small, clean living facilities, light, and an exercise yard were pro-
vided and that contact with relatives, counsel, a physician, and a spiritual
advisor was permitted. In light of these factors it was held that the
25. United States v. Jones, 207 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1953); Gordon v. Garrson,
77 F. Supp. 477 (E.D. Il. 1948). Cf. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir.
1944), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887, 65 S. Ct. 1568 (1945).
26. See text accompanying note 18, supra.
27. Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 338 U.S. 864, 70 S. Ct. 146 (1949); Application of Middlebrooks, 88 F.
Supp. 943 (S.D. Cal. 1950), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., Ross v. Middlebrooks,
188 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1951), cert denied, 342 U.S. 862, 72 S. Ct. 90 (1951)
(use of "stocks," "picts," and "Sweatboxes") ; In Re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (S.D.
Ga. 1889) (chaining a prisoner to the bars of his cell by the neck for long periods
in a standing position).
28. In Re Berry, 113 Cal. App. 2d 613, 248 P.2d 420 (1952).
29. 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska 1951).
30. Id. at 289.
31. Rosenberg v. Carrol, 99 F. Supp. 630 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
32. Id. at 631. (The defendant had never confessed to spy charges at her trial
and due to the vast amount of publicity surrounding the case, the prisoner apparently
felt that the Government wanted a confession to justify its conviction).
33. 62 Stat. 849 (1948), 18 U.S.C. § 4082 (1958).
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prisoner's incarceration in the death cell did not amount to cruel and
unusual punishment within the meaning of the eighth amendment.
Although cases involving cruel and unusual punishment have in the
past been concerned mainly with physical discomfort, the area may be
expanding. The standards proposed in the Fulwood case appear to
extend the concept beyond the purely physical punishments to those
involving the application of mental and emotional stress to a degree
which is unduly harsh in light of the need for its imposition.
B.
Freedom of Speech and Communication.
Even under the broadest interpretations of the language and purpose
of the first amendment it is acknowledged that the right of free speech
is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.3 4 For a convict,
the very nature of the prison environment imposes restrictions on his
right of free speech. A prisoner may be punished for uttering words
which tend to incite a breach of prison discipline or a riot, 5 much the
same as any free individual might be restrained from breaching the peace.38
It would seem less clear, however, whether a convict may constitutionally
be forced into complete silence.
In 1821 a method of penology was developed which prohibited speech.
It was known as' the Auburn System and it originated at the State
Prison of New York.37
The theory of the "Auburn System" was simplicity itself. Maintain si-
lence at all times, and you remove absolutely from all prisoners the
chance to corrupt each other. They can do each other no damage by their
physical proximity, but if granted communication with each other,
they become a force for evil and an ever present source for in-
surrection and riot.8
It is questionable whether such a system is a reasonable method of
enforcing discipline. The system does not seem desirable if, as many
penologists have insisted, one of the goals of incarceration is to reform
the convict and better prepare him for life in a free society. Total silence
is in fact no longer an accepted theory of prison administration; the
convict, however, faces a number of less direct restrictions on his
freedom to speak and communicate, particularly with persons outside the
institution.
34. De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 57 S. Ct. 255 (1937) ; Near v. Minnesota,
283 U.S. 697, 51 S. Ct. 625 (1931); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373,
47 S. Ct. 641, 647 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ; Schenck v. United States, 249
U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919).
35. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D.D.C. 1962).
36. Cf. Finer v. Ntw York, 340 U.S. 315, 71 S. Ct. 303 (1950); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 62 S. Ct. 766 (1941).
37. GILIN, op. cit. supra note 1, at 279.
38. LEwis, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN PRISONS AND PRISON CUSTOMS
1776-1845, at 86-87 (1922).
[VOL. 8
23
Editors: Comments
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1963
SPRING 1963]
The prisoner's primary contact with the outside world is through
the mail. The courts have consistently upheld official interference in this
area, maintaining that regulation of the mail falls within administrative
discretion.39 And while this regulation apparently may not be exercised
arbitrarily,40 it has afforded the prison officials a substantial degree of
control. 41 Censorship of outgoing42 and in-coming 43 mail has been upheld.
However, interference with a prisoner's communication with the courts,
executive authorities, or counsel is beyond the power of prison au-
thorities. 44 The prevention of a timely appeal by a warden's suppression
of appeal papers has been held violative of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment.45
Where prisoners have claimed that censorship of mail specifically
violates the right of free speech, they have achieved little satisfaction. In
Numer v. Miller,46 the petitioner was refused permission to mail lesson
sheets to the extension division of the University of California in
connection with a correspondence course in English. The first assignment
asked for the student's reasons for taking the course. The petitioner
claimed to have answered his assignment truthfully. His paper stated
that he was taking the course because he intended upon his release to
write a book exposing the prison authorities as "a sadistic group in
charge of the brutality department. '4 7 The prisoner was told that he would
not be allowed to proceed with the course unless he "changed his tactics. ' 48
The court disposed of the case by treating the refusal as a legitimate
disciplinary measure; it then dismissed the prisoner's contention that
freedom of speech had been denied him, by adding:
A prisoner who persists in abusing a privilege or opportunity ex-
tended to all prison inmates is in no position to complain of unequal
treatment if the privilege is taken away from him.49
Thus, the court thought it unnecessary to touch the constitutional ques-
tion of freedom of speech, viewing the whole problem as one of dis-
cipline. It is submitted that this is the approach most likely to be
maintained when dealing with inmates' mail and that, except for peti-
tions for appeal, letters of complaint to prison authorities, and communica-
39. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 270, 375 (D.D.C. 1962).
40. Dayton v. McGranery, 201 F.2d 711, 712 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (dictum).
41. Ibid.
42. Gerrish v. State of Maine, 89 F. Supp. 244 (S. D. Maine 1950); Reilly
v. Hiatt, 63 F. Supp. 477 (M.D. Pa. 1945) ; State ex rel. Jacobs v. Warden of
Maryland Penitentiary, 190 Md. 755, 59 A.2d 753 (1948).
43. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 375 (D.D.C. 1962) (refusal to
allow delivery of newspapers containing inflammatory articles upheld).
44. State ex rel. Jacobs v. Warden of Maryland Penitentiary, 190 Md. 755, 59A.2d 753 (1948). See also Lowe v. Haitt, 77 F. Supp. 303 (M.D. Pa. 1948).
45. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206, 71 S. Ct. 262 (1951);
Sweet v. State, 233 Ind. 160, 117 N.E.2d 745 (1954).
46. 165 F.2d 986 (9th Cir. 1948).
47. Id. at 986.
48. Ibid.
49. Id. at 987.
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tion with counsel concerning his case, the prisoner may be completely
regulated as to what, when, and to whom he writes, without any con-
stitutional problem of free speech arising.5"
The visitation privilege has similarly been held to come within the
control of prison officials, and so long as the privilege has not been denied
arbitrarily the courts have been tolerant.5 1 The approach has once again
been to look at the problem as one of prison administration.
Given the approach of the courts, it may be possible to argue,
using the Fulwood standards, that under certain circumstances, denial of
a prisoner's right to speak and communicate amounts to cruel and
unusual punishment.5 2 The Auburn System," if practiced today, could no
doubt be attacked on this basis. But with the exception of total silence
as a method of punishment, it is difficult to imagine circumstances severe
enough to warrant a court's interference with the internal discipline of a
prison.
C.
Freedom of Religion.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
freedom of religion, and the fourteenth amendment protects citizens from
state action infringing upon that freedom.5 4 However, the courts have
drawn a distinction between freedom to believe and freedom to exercise
one's belief, pointing out that the former is absolute and the latter is
not.5 15 Freedom to practice one's religion is to be considered in the light
of the general public welfare.56 The courts have upheld curtailment of
the free exercise of religion only where they have found the restriction
reasonably necessary to protect a paramount social interest.57
Restriction on the free exercise of religion in prisons has been
upheld as a necessary incident to prison discipline.5 8 In McBride v.
50. Although prisoners' mail may be, and often is, heavily censored, a new area
of communication by the prisoners among themselves and with the outside world
has been developing in recent years. Prison newspapers circulated in and out of the
prison have been gaining recognition. The censorship of these organs seems to be
less strict than one would suppose. See Nelson, The Penal Press: Voice of the
Prisoner, 23 FXD. PROB. 53 (1959).
51. Laughlin v. Cummings, 105 F.2d 71 (D.D.C. 1939); See also Henry v.
Wilson, 249 Ky. 589, 61 S.W.2d 305 (1933); Wilmans v. Harston, 334 S.W. 233
(Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
52. See text accompanying note 14, supra.
53. See text accompanying note 37, supra.
54. Cantwell v. State of Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940).
55. 310 U.S. at 303-04, 60 S. Ct. at 603. See notes 59 and 61, infra.
56. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 98 S. Ct. 244 (1878); Brown v.
McGinnis, 10 N.Y.2d 531, 225 N.Y.S.2d 497, 180 N.E.2d 791 (1962).
57. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super-Market of Massachusetts, 366 U.S. 617,
81 S. Ct. 1122 (1961) (protection of day of rest) ; Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944) (protection of children) ; Cantwell v. State of
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S. Ct. 900 (1940). See Antieu, The Limitations of
Religious Liberty, 18 FORDHAM L. REV. 221 (1949).
58. Pierce v. La Vallee, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
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McCorkle,5 9 the petitioner and thirty other men, all of whom had been
placed in a segregated wing of the State Prison for disciplinary reasons,
were prevented from attending Mass on Sundays and holydays as pre-
scribed by the Roman Catholic Church. The court recognized that at-
tendance at Mass was the "exercise of religion" and that the action taken
by the prison authorities undeniably curtailed it, even though the prisoner
was allowed to receive spiritual comfort from the prison chaplain in
his own cell. The court found, however, that:
The social interest involved in depriving plaintiff of the opportunity
to attend Mass with the rest of the prison population can only be
the preservation of order and discipline in the prison. If plaintiff
has lost any right, it has come about by his own hand. The interest
of an orderly society that required his imprisonment insists only
that he be privileged to worship God to the extent that his conduct in
prison permits. [Emphasis added] .6
Thus, once again in a disciplinary matter a prisoner's constitutional
rights were subordinated to the discretion of the prison officials.
Even the inmate who stays out of trouble is not necessarily guaranteed
the right to exercise his religion. In Fulwood v. Clemmer,61 where a
particular sect was permitted to hold religious services in prison, it was
decided that all other religious groups in the institution had to be granted
the same privilege. But in that case an order of the Commissioners of
the District of Columbia required prison officials to make facilities avail-
able without regard to race and religion.6 2  In the absence of such
legislation it is arguable that prison authorities could prohibit all exercise
of religion. In such a case it would seem that the only constitutional
basis for relief might be a claim that the total denial of the right to
practice religion amounts to cruel and unusual punishment.
A factor which would undoubtedly hinder such an argument is
that the "punishment" resulting from the denial of religious activity is
wholly mental. The cases in which cruel and unusual punishment has
been found to exist have invariably involved some physical abuse.63 There
is an implication in the Fulwood decision that the court would have
recognized mental abuse as constituting cruel punishment, 64 but this
view has not yet been clearly formulated or widely accepted.
The prisoner's right to believe is as absolute as is that of the free
man's,6 5 but his right to exercise and practice religion is much more
59. 44 N.J. Super. 468, 130 A.2d 881 (App. Div. 1957).
60. Id. at 479.
61. 206 F. Supp. 370, 374 (D.D.C. 1962).
62. Order of the Commissioners of the District of Columbia No. 6514-B (Nov.
25, 1953).
63. See, for example, the cases cited in footnote 34, supra.
64. Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370, 379 (D.D.C. 1962).
65. In re Ferguson, 55 Cal.2d 663, 361 P.2d 417, cert. denied sub. nom.,
Ferguson v. Heinze, 368 U.S. 864, 82 S. Ct. 111 (1961).
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limited due to the wide discretion granted prison officials to regulate all
aspects of his existence.6 6
II.
REMEDIES AVAILABLE WHEN CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
HAVE BEEN ABRIDGED.
From the foregoing discussion it is apparent that, with the ex-
ception of the right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
and the right to somewhat equal treatment within the prison, the con-
stitutional rights of convicts are at best nebulous. Paradoxically, the
prisoner has many potential remedies for infringement of his constitu-
tional rights, although no one has proven fully satisfactory.,7
The writ of habeas corpus has been the most common device used
by prisoners seeking relief from post-trial deprivation of rights. However,
the use of this writ has been inhibited by the historic rules governing its
issuance. Habeas corpus traditionally has been regarded as a method
by which one "illegally" or "unlawfully" restrained might be released.68
For years the courts consistently defined an "illegal" or an "unlawful"
restraint as one imposed by a court that lacked proper jurisdiction, and
only in such cases was the writ issued.6 9 Thus, prisoners who have
claimed loss of rights after a valid trial very often have been denied
the writ on the ground that events occurring after a trial do not affect
the court's original jurisdiction.70 The more progressive courts, however,
have rejected this view and have granted the writ when the prisoner has
been deprived of his constitutional rights, even though the detention was
legal.71 Unfortunately this position has not been accepted by the majority
of jurisdictions.
A further limitation of the writ is that absolute release was historically
the only relief available in a habeas corpus proceeding.7 2 Undoubtedly
this factor has influenced the decisions of many judges who have been
reluctant to release a validly convicted prisoner. 78 The more modern view,
and one which is gaining a measure of acceptance, gives the writ a wider
scope of remedies, including a directive by the courts to the prison
66. Pierce v. La Vallee, 212 F. Supp. 865 (N.D.N.Y. 1962).
67. See Note, Prisoners' Remedies For Mistreatment, 59 YALE L.J. 800 (1950)
for a basic though somewhat dated treatment of the subject.
68. JnNKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 342 (1912).
69. Ex Parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193, 203 (1830).
70. Henson v. Welch, 199 F.2d 367 (4th Cir. 1952) ; Williams v. Steele, 194
F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Edmondson v. Warden of Maryland House of Correction,
194 Md. 710, 69 A.2d 820 (1949); Chapman v. Graham, 2 Utah 2d 156, 270 P.2d
821 (1954).
71. Ex Parte Maro, 248 P.2d 135 (Cal. 1952); Cf. United States v. Kennedy,
157 F.2d 811, 813 (2d Cir. 1946).
72. McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 55 S. Ct. 24 (1934).
73. Snow v. Roche, 143 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 788,
65 S. Ct. 311 (1944); Ex Parte Pickins, 101 F. Supp. 285 (D. Alaska, 1951);
Truman v. Hafn, 154 Neb. 501, 48 N.W2d 418 (1951).
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administrators to respect the constitutional rights of the prisoner.74 But
this view has been largely limited to the federal courts where the
remedies granted have been based upon a federal statute which au-
thorizes a court in habeas corpus proceedings to dispose of the party
"as law and justice require. '7 5 However, a state prisoner seeking entry
into a federal court to take advantage of this statute will encounter an
obstacle which may be insurmountable. Another federal statute provides
that federal habeas corpus will not be granted to persons in state
custody until the applicant has exhausted all state remedies, unless the
remedies provided by the state would be ineffective in protecting the
prisoner's rights.7 6 This doctrine of "exhaustion" has been the greatest
single factor in limiting the use of federal habeas corpus. While it would
be clearly undesirable for the federal courts to arbitrarily infringe upon
the states' jurisdiction (hence the value of the doctrine), it should also
be remembered that the reluctance of the state courts to interfere with
prison administration sometimes makes it exceedingly difficult for a
prisoner to have his rights protected at that level.
Remedies other than habeas corpus have been resorted to but with
little success. Injunctions have been sought to restrain prison officials
from continuing objectionable practices, but courts have generally re-
fused to grant relief.7  It may also be possible for a prisoner to invoke the
contempt power of a court to protect his rights. The theory upon which
this remedy is based is that the penal authorities are ex-officio officers of
the court in that they carry out its judgments; they are ordered- to
receive and safely keep the prisoner, and when they do not do this the
court may punish them by using its inherent powers. Two cases have
held that a person who violates the rights of prisoners in his charge is
guilty of contempt of court.78 But more recent cases have denied this
remedy on the ground that supervision of penal institutions is an execu-
tive rather than a judicial function.79
It is also possible for the federal authorities to bring a criminal
action under the Civil Rights Act against state officials who have mis-
treated prisoners in their custody. Section 242 provides:
74. Coffin v. Reichard, 143 F.2d 443 (6th Cir. 1944); Harper v. Wall, 85 F.
Supp. 783 (D. N.J. 1949); and see Parker v. Ellis, 262 U.S. 574, 80 S. Ct. 909
(1960) where in a dissenting opinion written by Chief Justice Warren and concurred
in by Justices Black and Douglas, the Chief Justice favored granting a remedy to
a man who was not even a prisoner at the time the suit was brought.
75. 62 Stat. 965 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1958).
76. 62 Stat. 967 (1948), 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1958).
77. Generally equity will refuse to enjoin threatened physical injury to the
person or threatened criminal acts. See McCLINTOCK, EQUITY §§ 158, 164 (2d
ed. 1948). But see Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 Fed. 687 (D. Nev. 1918); Davis v.
Berry, 216 Fed. 413 (E.D. Iowa, 1914), rev'd as moot, 242 U.S. 468, 37 S. Ct. 208
(1917).
78. In re Birdsong, 39 Fed. 599 (S.D. Ga. 1899); Howard v. State, 28 Ariz.
117, 245 P.2d 268 (1952).
79. Ridgway v. Superior Court of Yavapai County, 74 Ariz. 117, 245 P.2d 268
(1952) ; People v. District Court, 89 Colo. 78, 299 Pac. 1 (1931).
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Whoever, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation or
custom, wilfully subjects an inhabitant of any State, Territory, or
District to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United
States . . . shall be fined $1,000 or be imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.80
Prosecutions under the act have been sustained,8 1 but there are apparent
limitations since criminal prosecutions cannot be initiated by the prisoner
and civil servants may be reluctant to prosecute their fellows.
The Civil Rights Act also permits a civil action by a prisoner against
those who have deprived him of his constitutional rights.8 2 Several cases
have permitted claims under the act where prison mistreatment was
alleged. 83 Furthermore it has been held that a prisoner may bring suit
under the Civil Rights Act even where the state prohibits its convicts
from maintaining a civil action,8 4 and that the state prisoner need not
first exhaust his state remedies prior to bringing suit under the act.8 5
Thus, it appears that a proceeding under the Civil Rights Act would be
the most readily available remedy to either a state or federal prisoner
whose constitutional rights have allegedly been violated by the penal
officials. However, the only relief granted in such an action would be
monetary compensation and therefore the remedy would offer little
practical protection to the prisoner's rights. Its main effect is as a de-
terrent to officials who are aware of the existence of the statute.
The possibility of a new remedy remains. Legislation might be
passed to grant a hearing to prisoners who claim that their constitutional
rights have been violated by their jailers. No state now has such legisla-
tion. However, in 1949 Illinois was the first state to enact a Post-
Conviction Hearing Act providing for a prompt hearing upon allegations
by a prisoner that he was deprived of his constitutional rights at the time
of his trial.8 6 To secure a hearing the prisoner had only to submit a
petition which clearly set forth the proceeding in which he was convicted,
the date of the final judgment, and the manner in which his constitutional
rights were allegedly violated.87 The court could then grant whatever
relief it deemed appropriate. Although that act was limited to pre-
commitment deprivation of rights, it would be feasible to extend the
80. 62 Stat. 696 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 242 (1958).
81. United States v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 925 (8th Cir. 1956) ; United States v.
Walker, 216 F.2d 683 (5th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 959 (1955).
82. 17 Stat. 13 (1871), 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1958): "Every person who under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage of any State . .. ,
subjects . . . any person . . . to the deprivation of any rights secured by the
Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured ....
83. Hughs v. Noble, 295 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1961); Coleman v. Johnston, 247
F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1957); McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal.
1955).
84. McCollum v. Mayfield, 130 F. Supp. 112 (N.D. Cal. 1955).
85. Pierce v. La Vallee, 293 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1961).
86. ILL. ANN. STAT. tit. 38, §§ 826-832 (Supp. 1962).
87. Id. at § 827.
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remedy to provide relief for post-conviction acts by the penal authorities.
Under such a statute procedural intricacies would be avoided and the
constitutional rights of the prisoner would be effectively protected.
III.
CONCLUSION.
In the conflict between the protection of the post-conviction rights of
prisoners and the necessity of maintaining prison discipline, the courts in
the past have favored the latter. Except for the most unusual situation,
involving gross physical mistreatment, the judiciary has declined to
supervise the administration of penal institutions. The Fulwood decision
may indicate a new trend toward greater recognition and protection of
convicts' rights. It is still too early to be certain. It does seem clear, how-
ever, that if such recognition and protection are to be extended, they
will be based upon a broader interpretation of the eighth amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
It would seem that the theory of retributive penology is slowly being
replaced by one which seeks to promote rehabilitation. Perhaps, in the
end, we can expect a greater recognition of the inmates' rights only
when the more progressive theory is fully accepted and effectuated by the
prison administrators themselves.
Myron A. Hyman
CORPORATIONS,-CUMULATIVE VOTING--ADvISABILITY OF RETAINING
THE CUMULATIVE VOTING PROVISION IN THE PENNSYLVANIA
CONSTITUTION.
In recent years there has been much pressure for a revision of the
Pennsylvania constitution. It is a document which has been law since 1874,
and consequently many believe that the time is long overdue for significant
changes. The purpose of this comment is to examine one section which
has been the subject of some concern and to propose a view which may be
in conformity with the current movement. Article XVI, section 4 provides:
In all elections for directors or managers of a corporation, each mem-
ber or shareholder may cast the whole number of his votes for one
candidate, or distribute them upon two or more candidates, as he
may prefer.'
Simply stated, section 4 has adopted what is popularly known as cumula-
tive voting. The purpose of this method of electing corporate directors is
to provide the minority stockholders with an opportunity to attain some
1. PA. CONST. art. 16, § 4.
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degree of representation, while at the same time to prevent abuses by the
controlling majority.2
The mechanics of this device are rather simple. As indicated by the
provision above, a stockholder has as many votes as he has shares, multi-
plied by the number of directors to be elected. 3 Thus, where a stockholder
owns ten shares at a time when ten directors are to be elected, he has a
total of one hundred votes. These he may cast in a block or distribute
among the candidates. The utility of the device becomes apparent when a
substantial minority concentrates its vote on a particular candidate (or
candidates) : the cumulative effect far exceeds any power that could have
been brought to bear under the normal voting procedure. 4 The ultimate
question to be considered here is the propriety of granting, by constitutional
mandate, such seemingly disproportionate power to minority shareholders.
I.
HISTORY OF CUMULATIVE VOTING.
A.
In General.
Cumulative voting was first introduced in the Illinois constitution of
1870. Its primary sponsor was Joseph Medill, a newspaper editor and an
ardent advocate of the economic theories of John Stuart Mill.5 Indeed,
it is Mill's principle of minority representation which appears to be the
basis of cumulative voting. 6 Medill, using his position and paper as instru-
ments of influence, succeeded in getting the new device adopted, but only
after the state legislature had applied it to its own voting procedures.
Representation in the legislature was a problem at the time because the
state was divided in such a way that one half was controlled by one party
2. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10
Bus. LAW. 3 (Apr., 1955). See also STEVENS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 117 (1936); Young, The Case for Cumulative Voting, 1950 Wis.
L. REV. 49.
3. This of course assumes that there is one vote per share.
4. A formula has been devised to determine the minimum number of votes a
minority would need to place one or more men of its choosing on a board. BAKER
AND CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 203 (3d ed. 1959).
a: Number of directors it is desired to elect.
b: Total number of voting shares. ab
c: Total number of directors to be elected. X = - + 1
X: Minimum number of shares needed. c + 1
If we assume that the minority wants to elect three men on a board of nine, and
there are 1000 voting shares, it would require 301 shares to attain its goal. If one
candidate was sought to be elected, only 101 shares would be called for. If the
usual method of electing a board were used 501 shares could elect all nine men.
5. Campbell, The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors, 10
Bus. LAW. 3 (Apr., 1955). See also Steadman and Gibson, Should Cumulative
Voting for Directors be Mandatory? - A Debate, 11 Bus. LAW. 9 (Nov., 1955).
6. Mill thought that the minority should have some voice in deliberative bodies.
This, he believed, would result in better achievements since such bodies would be
more sensitive to the will of the electorate. MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT
(1860).
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while the opposition was in power in the remainder; lack of public
voice resulted.
The provision finally incorporated into the Illinois constitution appears
quite similar to the one adopted by Pennsylvania:
The general assembly shall provide, by law, that in all elections for
directors or managers of incorporated companies, every stockholder
shall have the right to vote . . . the number of shares of stock
owned by him, for as many persons as there are directors or managers
to be elected, or to cumulate said shares, and give one candidate as
many votes as the number of directors multiplied by the number of
his shares of stock shall equal, or to distribute them on the same prin-
ciple among as many candidates as he shall think fit; and such directors
or managers shall not be elected in any other manner.7
Since 1870, those states which have adopted cumulative voting have
done so in one of two ways: by constitutional mandate or by statute. The
constitutional provisions embodying the scheme fall into three general
categories: (1) those requiring the legislature to enact a law providing
for such voting, and also containing a clause to the effect that the "direc-
tors shall not be elected in any other manner ;" (2) those not requiring the
legislature to act, but containing the latter clause; and (3) those containing
neither the provision nor the clause. Thirteen jurisdictions, including
Pennsylvania, have chosen one of these methods to provide for this device.,
Pennsylvania's provision falls within the last category; and the Common-
wealth's highest court has held that such a provision is self-executing
and needs no legislative act to enforce it.9 The legislature has nevertheless
passed a statute to make more explicit the mechanics of such voting.' 0
Those states which have chosen the purely legislative approach have
done so by enacting either a mandatory" or permissive' 2 provision.
The distinctions between the constitutional provision and the statute
which is mandatory do not seem very significant. It should be noted, how-
ever, that it is easier to amend or modify the latter, a fact which is
evidenced by Pennsylvania's lack of success in effecting any substantial
constitutional change, to say nothing of a complete revision. Furthermore,
a close examination of the statutes reveals that generally they are drawn
so as to illustrate the mechanics of cumulative voting, while the constitu-
tional provision merely grants the right. If any conclusion can be reached,
7. Ill. CONST. art. XI, § 3.
8. For a list of those states which have constitutional provisions making cumula-
tive voting mandatory see Appendix A.
9. Pierce v. Commissioner, 104 Pa. 150 (1883). See also Central Iron Works
v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 2 Dauph. 308 (1895).
10. "In all elections for directors . . . each member or shareholder . . . may
cast the whole number of his votes for one candidate, or distribute them . . . that
is to say: If the said member or stockholder . . . own[s] one share of stock . . .
or is entitled to one vote for each of six directors by virtue thereof, he may give
one vote to each of said six directors, or six votes for anyone thereof .... PA. STAT.
§ 1, P.L. 47 (Purdon, 1876), (now PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-505 (1958)).
11. See Appendix B.
12. See Appendix C.
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it is that the right of cumulative voting is somewhat more protected by
a constitutional than by a statutory provision.
Prior to 1955, the Model Business Corporation Act proposed a man-
datory cumulative voting provision only.' 3 In that year, however, the
provision was written in the alternative, that is, it could be either manda-
tory or permissive in its terms. 14 If the latter type was selected by a state,
the question of whether there must be such voting if the articles of incor-
poration (or the by-laws) made no mention of the subject, could be
phrased either: "The articles of incorporation may provide . .. .
or "unless the articles of incorporation otherwise provide . . . ." While
it would be reasonable to conclude from this that the Model Act 15 has not
taken a definite stand on two important questions, it might be significant
to note that cumulative voting is included in the Model By-Laws.' 6
B.
History In Pennsylvania.
1. The Constitutional Convention 1873.
As has been noted, cumulative voting was incorporated into the Penn-
sylvania constitution almost ninety years ago. Its merits and failures were
considered at the constitutional convention held in 1873. If an intelligent
determination is to be made regarding the advisability of retaining the
device, it would seem that an examination of the reasons for its adoption
should be undertaken. If those reasons are as valid today as they were
thought to be then, perhaps our inquiry is at an end. It is clear, however,
that any inquiry should commence with the proceedings at the convention.' 7
After a rather strong debate, the convention's Committee on Private
Corporations proposed a cumulative voting provision which, upon its first
reading,' 8 was adopted by a 36-32 vote. The provision as reported by the
committee stated:
In all elections for the managing officers of a corporation, each mem-
ber or shareholder shall have as many votes as he has shares, multi-
plied by the number of officers to be elected, and he may cast the
whole number of his votes for one candidate or distribute them upon
two or more candidates as he may prefer.' 9
The initial debate had considered the alleged right of the corporate
majority to control in the light of the supposed abuses that that control
13. 1 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. 522 (1960).
14. MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 31.
15. The Act is a research project of the American Bar Foundation and is
edited by a committee of the American Bar Association.
16. MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT BY-LAWS, art. 2, sec. 11 (1960).
17. DEBATES Ol THE CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYLVANIA
(1873-74).
18. The convention rules required that there be three readings before final
adoption.
19. 4 DEBATES OF THE CONVENTION To AMEND THE CONSTITUTION OF PENNSYL-
VANIA 592 (1873-74). (Hereafter cited as DEBATES).
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would impose upon the minority. The protection of the minority from
abuses was clearly the primary concern of the committee. A basic assump-
tion in all of the speeches in favor of cumulative voting was that a cor-
poration is detrimental to both the stockholders and the public. "[T]he
inevitable result is that the public in general is injured; that favoritism is
exercised toward certain persons, while the great mass of the community
indirectly is plundered or injured.120 It was emphasized that since the
stockholders were barred from directors' meetings, the stockholders in's
general, and the minority in particular, were powerless to restrain the
forces in control. The remedies then available for use against a plunder-
ing directorate were held to be both too little and too late. More balance
was therefore deemed desirable. It was even suggested that the principle,
applicable to partnerships, that each member is entitled to a hand in the
making of policy, was equally valid in the corporate field.21 The strongest
arguments against the innovation were that it gravely threatened the tradi-
tional concept of majority rule and that the minority had adequate means
at its disposal for self-protection.
It was after the second reading that the advisability of providing for
cumulative voting in the constitution rather than in a statute was first
questioned. One of the delegates expressed his doubts:
The trouble I have about this section is . . .that the dangers arising
from it may be greater than we are able to see, and while if it was a
statute which could be repealable, we could vote for it as an experi-
ment because of certain advantages that are sure to follow, yet when
it is to become part of the Constitution and be irrepealable, we may
be unable to vote for it because of the dangers that we imagine are
likely to follow. 22
This misgiving was apparently not shared by others, for the point, although
clearly significant, was never again mentioned at the convention. Generally,
the delegates were concerned with how effectively, if at all, cumulative
voting could eliminate the evils of the then current system. Furthermore,
in debating the issues it is this writer's opinion that there was very little
intelligent give and take by the participants. If a particular point was made
by one delegate, more often than not another would counter with a con-
cept entirely removed from the first. It is clear that discussions of this
character were not capable of producing new light on the issues. In any
case, the provision passed its second reading by a count of 52-35.23
After the third reading and prior to the final vote, one delegate
moved to strike the entire section on the ground that it failed to distinguish
between certain types of corporations. He was particularly concerned over
the fact that charitable corporations were subject to its rule. The motion
20. Id. at 605.
21. Id. at 604-05.
22. 5 DEBATES at 766.
23. Id. at 768.
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was not discussed and was dealt a substantial 53-21 defeat. Cumulative
voting was then formally adopted.
What conclusions, if any, can be drawn from the foregoing review?
After examining the minutes of the convention, it is clear that the delegates
had a dim view of the corporation as a legal entity. Many actually were of
the opinion that it was an artificial person created for the sole purpose of
plundering the unsuspecting stockholders and public. Some protective
device was believed necessary to restore balance to the corporate structure
and management. And it was for this compelling reason that the delegates
to Pennsylvania's Constitutional Convention turned to that system which
Illinois had adopted only a few years earlier. And it is for this reason that
cumulative voting has the force of constitutional mandate today. But the
modern corporation is hardly considered a plunderer of the unsuspecting.
The public is more aware, the stockholders are more active, and the govern-
ment is less tolerant. It would seem that what was the compelling justifica-
tion for inclusion in the constitution in the late nineteenth century is now
nothing more than an item of history.
2. Recent Developments.
In 1959, The Pennsylvania Commission on Constitutional Revision
recommended in its Woodside Report that no change be made in section 424
Such recommendation was made in the face of a prior suggestion by the
Pennsylvania Bar Association that the provision embodying cumulative
voting be repealed. In a letter from the chairman of the Bar's Committee
on Corporation Law to the Revision Commission, the following appeared:
The Corporation Law Committee of the Bar Association and the en-
tire Association unanimously felt that the section of the Constitution,
making cumulative voting mandatory ... [is] properly a matter for
legislation but [has] no place in a Constitution.25
One can only speculate as to why the Revision Commission chose to reject
the Bar's proposal. Perhaps the Commission did not consider it advisable
to become committed to the repeal of a provision of relatively small import
(when compared with some of the other outmoded provisions) for fear
of endangering its major goal, mainly, revision of the constitution. Four
attempts at general revision had been made earlier, and all had failed
"... due in part to public apathy but, more important, to the operation of
special interests groups combining forces to defeat particular proposals by
the device of defeating all proposals."2 6
Despite its initial failure, the Bar Association, and in particular its
Committee on Corporations, has not abandoned its original position. And
24. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION 79 (1959).
25. Letter to the Commission on Constitutional Revision from the Chairman of
the Corporation Law Committee, May 16, 1958 at 3.
26. Callender, The Constitution of Pennsylvania - Should it be Revised?, 29
PA. BAR Ass. QUART. 205 (March, 1958). The other four attempts were made in
1921, 1926, 1936 and 1953.
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while the members of the committee are not in total agreement, that very
same position is being urged anew, as is evidenced by the committee's
most recent recommendation:
Whether or not cumulative voting by shareholders of private corpora-
tions is desirable on its merits, as to which many lawyers violently
disagree, we agree that this provision is not of a constitutional nature,
and that the solution of the problem should be left to the General
Assembly, as it is in most states and both need not and should not be
spelled out in the Constitution.2 7
There are other groups and organizations which have manifested
much interest in a revision of the Pennsylvania constitution. Foremost
among these is the Committee for State Constitutional Revision. The Com-
mittee is presently formulating its recommendations which should be
revealed in the near future. It will be interesting to note what they and
others like them conclude with regard to section 4.
II.
CUMULATIVE VOTING: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS.
Before moving to the ultimate question of whether a cumulative voting
provision has a proper place in the Pennsylvania constitution, the various
views *with respect to the merits and demerits of cumulative voting per se
should be studied.2 8
Five basic arguments have been advanced in favor of cumulative
voting: (1) it is an essential part of democracy that minorities be repre-
sented; (2) cumulative voting is the only device that can assure adequate
minority representation; (3) the presence of minority voices on the board
of directors will stimulate a healthy exchange of ideas; (4) -minority
representation will have a "therapeutic" effect upon the whole board of
directors, tending to make it more responsive to the wishes of the stock-
holders; and (5) cumulative voting stimulates the stockholders to take
an active interest in the corporation.2 9
Taking the first two arguments above together, it should be remem-
bered that the theory of Mill, on which cumulative voting was founded,
was expounded with reference to governmental and not legal entities. It
cannot be said that a corporation is so similar to a political democracy as
to bear the same inherent obligations for minority representation, to say
the very least. But even preserving the analogy for the sake of argu-
27. Report of Committee on Corporations No. 13, 33 PA. BAR Assoc. QUART.
487 (1962).
28. See generally, Campbell, The Origin & Growth of Cumulative Voting for
Directors, 10 Bus. LAW. 3 (Apr., 1955); Steadman & Gibson, Should Cumulative
Voting for Directors be Mandatory? - A Debate, 11 Bus. LAW. 9, 16 (Nov., 1955) ;
Sturdy, Mandatory Cumulative Voting: An Anachronism, 16 Bus. LAW. 550, 567
(Apr., 1961).
29. Steadman & Gibson, op. cit. supra note 28, at 16.
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ment, the Bill of Rights and due process clause of corporate management
can be found in the fiduciary duty imposed upon directors, in the right
of the shareholders to a derivative suit, and in certain rights of inspec-
tion. Thus, even by characterizing the corporation as a democracy,
cumulative voting does not appear as a necessary protective for the
minority shareholders' rights.
It pays to take a realistic view of the argument that minority voices
on the board of directors will be beneficial for the exchange of ideas
that will result. A first consideration might be whether it is not more
beneficial for the corporation if the directors are generally in agreement.
It is obvious that disagreement among directors can result in tremendous
financial losses for the corporation from time and effort wasted in
argument. The fear of individual selfishness among the directors of a
board where minorities are not represented is not only circumscribed
by the fiduciary duty referred to above, but is also dissipated by the
fact that it is not altogether realistic. It can be fairly stated that the inci-
dence of mismanagement on the director level is significant only in small,
closely held corporations. The concerns of the director of a large, pub-
lically held corporation are basically the amount of profit and dividend,
and the relationship of the corporation to the government, the union
and the public.
That corporations today are of their own volition responsive to
the ideas and wishes of their shareholders can be seen readily from
the periodic reports issued to shareholders. Departments for handling
"owner" suggestions are not uncommon. The holder of a single share
has the right to express openly his ideas at shareholder meetings; he may
present motions and even have copies of his motion sent to the rest
of the stockholders. If his proposal has merit, it stands a fair chance of
being adopted.
Again, in an attempt to be realistic, it must be asked whether
anything will stimulate the average stockholder to take a more active
part in the activities of the corporation. It would seem that the average
stockholder is concerned only with the dividend he receives and that
the so-called "corporate gadfly" is atypical and often represents an un-
fortunate expense to the corporation. Very rarely are the directors less
than expert in the field of management; likewise for the officers in the
particular industry. Thus, it would seem that the arguments in favor
of cumulative voting have teeth only with respect to small, closely held
corporations - if at all.
III.
SHOULD THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION BE RETAINED?
Assuming now that cumulative voting should be preserved in some
manner (and as indicated above the merit of that contention is not
altogether free of doubt), the important question remains as to whether
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or not the right should be retained as a constitutional mandate. In
answering this question it is well to bear in mind that the function of
cumulative voting is not to insure minority representation on a particular
board but rather to secure the opportunity to obtain representation to
the minority.30
To argue that the right of cumulative voting should be preserved
in the constitution would seem to assume at least two things: that it
is a concept of paramount importance, and that cumulative voting as
it exists and is understood today is not something that will be sub-
jected to legitimate pressures for change or elimination.3 ' It is difficult to
understand the position of those who would attribute to cumulative
voting the same status and political significance as they would to per-
sonal liberties, the powers of the judiciary and other fundamental concepts
to be found in the constitutions of the several states.3 2 Only the peculiar
characteristics of the early development of the corporation in America, as
discussed above, can satisfactorily explain how the provision for cumula-
tive voting ever came to be in the Pennsylvania constitution initially. An
interesting example of how attitudes toward cumulative voting can
easily change is found in the Model Business Corporation Act 33
there the statutory right was changed from a mandatory to a permissive
provision. Needless to say, the argument that it would be dangerous
to leave cumulative voting to the will of the legislature because of the
power of certain pressure groups with respect to it, is really no argument
at all. It could be made about virtually every piece of legislation before
the General Assembly.
Perhaps of more vital interest in reviewing the desirability of
cumulative voting as a constitutional provision is a look at the effective-
ness of the provision thus far in Pennsylvania. Because of the significant
effect the classification of directors3 4 has upon the vitality of cumulative
voting in Pennsylvania, its meaning should be clear from the start. A
simple hypothetical will serve to illustrate the concept. X Corporation
has nine directors classified into three groups of three, each group being
elected every three years on successive years; X has outstanding 1000
voting shares. It is clear that it now would take 251 shares to elect one
director,35 whereas if all nine directors were elected at once only 101
shares would be required to elect one director. Wolfson v. Avery36
30. See Bohannan v. Corporation Commission, 82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379
(1957); Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955); Humphreys v.
Winous, 165 Ohio St. 45, 133 N.E.2d 780 (1956); Janney v. Philadelphia Transp.
Co., 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
31. Supra note 25.
32. Letter of Members of Committee No. 13, 17 May 1962.
33. Supra notes 13 and 14 and accompanying text.
34. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-403 (1958). See note 45 infra.
35. See formula, supra note 4.
36. 6 II. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955).
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was the first important decision dealing with this device of classification,3 7
whereby the vitality of cumulative voting provisions is seriously chal-
lenged. Illinois had a statute providing for classification of directors38
and the factual situation in Avery was not unlike that in the hypothetical
presented above. The Illinois Supreme Court found the statute to be
unlawful in view of the constitutional mandate3 9 (not exactly the same as
that found in the Pennsylvania constitution) for cumulative voting. The
latter was construed to require the election of all directors at one time:
On the contrary, the second clause of the section which deals ex-
clusively with cumulative voting, indicates . . . that all directors
must be elected at each regular election. It confers . . . the right
"to calculate said shares, and give one candidate as many votes as
the number of directors multiplied by the number of his shares of
stock .... "40
In Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co.,41 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had a similar classification of directors statute42 before it, but the Avery
case was distinguished by virtue of a difference in the language of the
Pennsylvania constitution with respect to cumulative voting: "Whether
the view thus taken [by the Illinois court in Avery] be right or wrong,
it distinguishes the case from the present one because the language in our
own constitution is different in that it makes no reference to 'directors'
as determining the number of cumulative votes to which each shareholder
is entitled." 43  The court also pointed out that the right does not
guarantee minority representation on a board, but merely gives the
minority shareholders "an opportunity to acquire such representation
.. . .- Focusing again on the effectiveness of cumulative voting in
Pennsylvania, it would seem from the Janney case that the right has been
diluted. It is not altogether clear from that case the extent to which the
right can be diminished by the device of classifying directors. It is con-
ceivable that under section 403 of the Pennsylvania Business Corporation
Act a corporation having only three directors could separately classify
them.4 5 In such a situation it would not be surprising, however, for the
37. There was a prior Pennsylvania case which briefly mentioned the effect of
classification upon section 4, but there was no holding on the precise issue.
Pittsburgh Steel Co. v. Walker, 92 P.L.J. 464 (1944).
38. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 157.35 (Smith-Hurd, 1954). This section was
repealed subsequent to the holding in Wolfson v. Avery (supra note 36), 1957,
July 9, Laws 1957, p. 2192, § 2.
39. See text accompanying footnote 7.
40. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 Ill. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701, 706 (1955).
41. 387 Pa. 282, 128 A.2d 76 (1956).
42. Supra note 34.
43. 387 Pa. at 290, 128 A.2d at 80-81.
44. 387 Pa. at 289, 128 A.2d at 80.
45. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-403 (1958) : "If the articles or by-laws of a
business corporation so provide, the directors of the corporation may be classified in
respect to the time for which they shall severally hold office . . . . In such case,
each class shall be as nearly equal in number as possible, the term of office of at
least one class shall expire in each year, and the members of a class shall not be
elected for a shorter period than one year, or for a longer period than four
years ... "
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Pennsylvania Supreme Court to hold that article XVI, section 4 of the
Pennsylvania constitution contemplates the election of more than one
director and that therefore such classification is unlawful.40 Of course more
difficult cases for the courts can be hypothesized, as, for example, where
a corporation with four directors seeks to classify them in two groups,
thus requiring thirty-four percent of the voting stock for one director to
be elected.
The voting strength of a minority in Pennsylvania can be diluted in
other ways.4 7 An obvious one is for the corporation to maintain a small
number of directors; or, the corporation could issue non-voting shares;
a third way would be for the board to fill its own vacancies.4 8 Indeed, it
appears that the only real protection given comes not from the constitu-
tional mandate but from a complementary statute whereby a minority
director cannot be removed without cause unless the number of votes for
a removal resolution exceeds that number of cumulative votes required to
elect one director at an election of the entire board.49 Thus, it would
seem that the right of cumulative voting in Pennsylvania is far from an
absolute right.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
The Janney case has demonstrated that the protection once believed
to belong to the minority shareholder by reason of the constitutional
provision for cumulative voting no longer exists to any substantial de-
gree. Moreover, the need for such protection can be seriously questioned
today with respect to publicly held corporations. The need for some
protection for closed corporations is clear but the constitution is not the
necessary source of that protection. Ideally, the best result in the area
of cumulative voting in Pennsylvania would be a revision of the con-
stitution with the deletion of article XVI, section 4, and the enactment
of an amendment to the Business Corporation Act, creating cumulative
voting rights only with respect to closely held corporations.
Stuart Hubert Savett
46. Cf. Wolfson v. Avery, supra note 40. The problem of abuse under a classi-
fication statute was noted by the court in Bohannan v. The Corporation Commission,
82 Ariz. 299, 313 P.2d 379 (1957): "If abuses do arise through classification of
directors by term, they can be corrected by the legislature. ... 313 P.2d at 381-82.
"[A]t least one method of staggering directors by terms plainly denies to the
stockholder this right; namely, where a corporation has three directors elected one
each year for a three year term. Unquestionably such a plan is illegal and void ...
in that it absolutely denies the mandatory right guaranteed to cumulate votes.
313 P.2d at 380-81.
47. Janney v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 387 Pa. 282, 287, 128 A.2d 76, 79
(1956).
48. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-402(3) (1958).
49. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2852-405 (1958): "A. . . .Unless the entire board
be removed, no individual director shall be removed in case the votes of a sufficient
number of shares are cast against the resolution for his removal, which if cumula-
tively voted at an election of the full board would be sufficient to elect one or more
directors."
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APPENDIX A
Each of the following states has a section in its constitution providing for
cumulative voting.
Illinois ....................... 1870 M ontana ..................... 1889
W est Virginia ................ 1872 M ississippi ................... 1890
Pennsylvania ................. 1874 Idaho ........................ 1890
M issouri ..................... 1875 Kentucky .................... 1891
Nebraska .................... 1889 South Carolina ............... 1895
North Dakota ................ 1889 Arizona .................... 1912
South Dakota ................ 1889
APPENDIX B
Each of the following states has provided for cumulative voting with a statutory
provision mandatory in nature, but has no constitutional provision.
K ansas ......................
M ichigan ....................
O hio ........................
W yoming ....................
A laska .......................
Arkansas ....................
California ....................
W ashington ..................
H awaii ......................
North Carolina ..............
APPENDIX C
Each of the following has provided for cumulative voting with a statutory
provision permissive in nature, but has no constitutional provision.
New York ...................
N evada ......................
M aryland ....................
Colorado .....................
New Jersey ..................
V irginia ....................
New Mexico ................
M innesota ...................
Puerto Rico ..................
Louisiana ....................
Delaware ....................
Rhode Island ................
Florida ......................
Indiana ......................
Tennessee ....................
Oklahoma ...................
District of Columbia .........
Vermont .....................
O regon ......................
T exas .......................
Alabama .....................
Connecticut ..................
Iow a ........................
U tah ........................
APPENDIX D
Each of the following has neither a constitutional nor a statutory provision.
Georgia New Hampshire
Maine Wisconsin
Massachusetts
APPENDIX E
Each of the following has included in its statutes one of the alternatives set
forth in the Model Business Corporation Act.
Those which have
Alaska
Idaho
Illinois
Kansas
Those which
Alabama
Colorado
Connectic
Delaware
Iowa
Minnesot
adopted the mandatory alternative are:
Michigan
Missouri
North Dakota
West Virginia
have adopted the permissive alternative are:
Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
Tennessee
Virginia
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